







Hiring discrimination in the French financial sector:  
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Nous étudions les déterminants de la discrimination à l’embauche dans le secteur financier 
français, à partir d’une expérience contrôlée. Nous trouvons que, d’une part, les différences 
d’accès aux entretiens d’embauche par les femmes et les hommes s’expliquent principalement 
par les anticipations de naissances des jeunes femmes et que, d’autre part, certaines 
caractéristiques institutionnelles permettent de compenser cette différence de traitement, de 





























We study the determinants of hiring gender discrimination in the French financial sector through 
a controlled experiment. We find that, on the one hand, the access differences to job interviews 
by women and men are primarily explained by the expectation of a maternity by young women 
and, on the other hand, we also find that some institutional mechanisms compensate this 











The existence of discrimination against some demographic groups is a growing concern in 
developed countries. According to Heckman [1998], discrimination is said to arise “if an 
otherwise identical person is treated differently by virtue of that person’s race or gender, and 
race or gender by themselves have no direct effect on productivity”. 
Cain [1986] distinguishes two major sources of discrimination. The first, advanced by Becker 
[1957] states that all workers have the same skills but that the majority demographic group 
(workers, employers and customers) are prejudiced against minority demographic groups, so 
that the majority group minimizes contact with others (taste discrimination). The second is 
advanced by Arrow [1972a, 1972b and 1973], McCall [1972] and Phelps [1972]. Employers are 
not able to evaluate perfectly the productivity of each applicant for a job. Hence, in the hiring 
process, employers combine direct evaluations of candidates (qualifications, experience, 
tests…), with beliefs concerning the average productivity of their demographic group. In this 
case statistical discrimination applies: two applicants for a job may be treated differently if they 
belong to different demographic groups, even though they have identical productive 
characteristics. This kind of discrimination can produce a self-fulfilling anticipation that 
contributes to maintain discrimination on the labor market (Lommerud and Vagstad [2000]). 
Since the seminal contribution by Becker [1957], many empirical studies have attempted to 
estimate the gender wage discrimination (Kunze [2000]). A first method, widespread in the 
literature, is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder [1973], Oaxaca [1973]). The gender 
wage gap is decomposed in two parts: first, the differences in productivity related endowments 
and, second, the unexplained part of the gap, a residual commonly interpreted as a measure of 
discrimination. A second method estimates discrimination by the difference between the wage 
gap and the estimated productivity gap. In France, this difference would be, for the whole 
economy in 1997, around 4% (Crépon, Deniau and Pérez-Duarte [2001]); Meurs and Ponthieux 
[2000]).
1 In the banking sector, this difference would reach 15% (Fakhfakh, Merlateau and 
Meurs [2002]). 
Even though they are interesting for their own sake, these estimations of the wage gap 
should be complemented by an evaluation of the other types of discrimination, mainly for two 
reasons. First, in the countries that have laws against discrimination, the discriminatory 
practices should move toward practices that are less easily detectable than wage discrimination. 
For instance, discriminatory practices could appear in the hiring process. Second, the reduction 
                                                                 
1 The gap is around 15% on American data (Blau and Kahn [1994] ; Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske 
[1999]).  4
of the wage gap increases the labor cost of women compared to men and could therefore 
decrease the probability that women get jobs. 
This paper studies discrimination in the access to hiring interviews. In order to evaluate this 
type of discrimination, one needs new data sources. Indeed, there is no general data source 
that would provide information on each application to job offers, including productive and non-
productive characteristics. The data must be collected by the researchers themselves. This 
constraint, however, offers the possibility to adapt the data collection process to the evaluation 
of discrimination. 
The collection method that appeared in the literature is correspondence testing. Its principle 
is to conduct a controlled experiment in the following way. One builds similar pairs of 
applications for both genders and sends them to the same job offers. When carefully done, this 
method should reveal the differences of treatment that are explained by the gender (for a 
survey, see Petit [2003]). The access to hiring interviews provides a priori an imperfect indicator 
of job access. Sending the candidates to the interviews would permit to measure their access to 
employment. However, several arguments can be advocated to justify the limitation of the 
experiment to correspondence testing (Riach and Rich [1991]). First, in the case of the financial 
sector, the recruiting process is costly for firms. Each interview generally requires a recruiter 
during a significant time period in order to organize discussions, ability tests etc. Therefore, we 
expect that a candidate receives an interview when the recruiter considers that (s)he has a 
significant chance of getting the job. Second, using correspondence testing, we are able to 
exercise an accurate control over the content of applications to be sure that all relevant 
characteristics other than gender are carefully matched (Riach and Rich [1991]). More precisely, 
we are sure that the physical appearance and personality of candidates have not been a hiring 
criterion and have not affected the outcome. These arguments are supported by several 
empirical studies: Neumark et al. [1996] find that the gender gap is 39% for job access and 35% 
for the access to interviews in favor of men in high-price restaurants; Kenney and Wissoker 
[1994] find a gap of 15% for both the access to interviews and to jobs against the Hispanic 
candidates. Third, the data collection procedure is less costly, so that it is possible to collect 
more data. 
Correspondence testing has sometimes been criticized. First, following Heckman [1998], it is 
possible that a given productive characteristics does not send the same signal depending on it 
belongs to a woman or a man. On can extend this argument to the characteristics of the 
correspondence test itself. A same curriculum vitae, for instance, can send a different signal 
depending on the gender of the applicant. In this situation, controlling for the content of the 
applications does not necessarily leads to a proper measure of discrimination. A way to account 
for this critic is to use regression methods that control for both the productive and non-
productive characteristics of the test, instead of comparing the percentages of success directly.  5
This paper extends the practice of the previous literature by controlling for all the characteristics 
available: application, type of job, type of firm and of the test (date of application, CV type). 
A second way to improve on the correspondence test deals with the statistical methods 
used. The normality of the estimators is used systematically, while it is guaranteed on large 
samples only. Moreover, this assumption is not tested when it is used. Here, the problem comes 
from the fact that the correspondence tests are performed on a small number of applications, 
because of the high collection cost of the data. In this paper, we recommend to use the 
bootstrap method. 
This paper uses the first correspondence test conducted in France (Petit [2004]). The 
financial sector has been chosen because it includes a large proportion of women in its labor 
force (53%, AFB Enquête Emploi [1999]). Even though this large proportion could suggest that 
there is no gender discrimination in this sector, it remains possible that there is a composition 
effect, according to which the women would be allocated to the less paid jobs. Notably, 63% of 
the employees are women while they represent only 31% of the executives. We wish to test this 
assumption by collecting data of both the jobs requiring low and high qualifications. However, 
we have not been able to collect data on the executives’ jobs for the two following reasons. 
First, there are few job offers at this level of qualification so that the sample size would have 
been too small; second, the recruiters may be more careful about the applications, especially by 
checking the references indicated in the CVs. Therefore we had no other choice than to replace 
the comparison between employees and executives by a comparison between low-skilled and 
high-skilled employees. Another reason to study the financial sector is that its collective 
agreement is especially favorable to women. Compared to the common rule, women have the 
right to 45 additional days of maternity vacations with full pay that is incurred by the employer. 
Women can replace it by 90 days of maternity vacations with a half-pay. 
We obtained two main findings. First, the probability of a maternity and the stronger 
involvement of women in children’s education would explain their lower access to job interviews. 
Second, some types of firms appear to favor women against men such that they fully 
compensate the former discriminatory effect. Overall, there is no significant discrimination. 
In the first section, we provide some theoretical motivations for the study and, in the second 
section, we present the data collection methodology that aims to eliminate the selection biases. 
The econometric model and its estimation are presented in the third section. The results are 
discussed in section 4.  6
1 Model 
We consider a simple situation where the total cost of a male worker for the employer is 
equal to: 
m m m F p w C + =  
where  m w  is the annual labor cost, p the probability of a paternity and  m F  the cost of a 
paternity vacation for the bank. In France, since January 1
st 2002, a man can take up to 14 days 
of paternity vacation with pay, whatever his status (Law of December 4th 2001). The duration of 
the vacation is extended to 21 days for a multiple birth. The cost of the vacation is paid by the 
Sécurité Sociale so that the firms only incur an organizational cost. The annual labor cost of a 
female worker is denoted  ￿  . The total cost of a female worker for an employer is therefore: 
   !  "  ￿ ￿ ￿ + + =   
where  ￿ "  is the annual labor cost, p the probability of a maternity vacation and  ￿ !  the 
maternity cost with  m f F F > . In France, women have the right to 112 days of maternity vacations 
with full pay that are mainly incurred by the Sécurité Sociale. In the financial sector, women 
have the right to 45 additional days of maternity vacations with full pay that is incurred by the 
employer. Women can replace it by 90 days of maternity vacations with a half-pay. The total 
cost therefore includes both the labor cost and the replacement cost of the employee on 
vacation. The quantity M represents the balance of two effects. The first effect is positive and 
represents the money equivalent to the reluctance of the employer to hire women, following 
Becker [1957]. The second effect is negative and represents the amount of money that the firm 
is ready to pay to reduce discrimination. Here, this amount is represented by a reduction of the 
perceived annual labor cost of a woman. This amount is related to the discrimination legislation, 
to the image of the firm or to the existence of a positive discrimination policy inside the firm. 
In the presence of hiring discrimination, we should observe a wage gap between women and 
men that is not correlated to the productive characteristics of the individuals; we denote it 
0 w w f m > − = δ . The perceived cost difference between women and men is therefore equal to: 
() δ − + − = − = M F F p C C y m f m f
* . 
We will observe a preferential hiring of men when the probability of maternity crosses the 





p p 0 y
−
− δ
= > ⇔ > .  7
The quantity  () m f F F / − δ  represents the benefit to cost ratio of women hiring. Indeed, if there 
is wage discrimination, it is less costly for the employer to hire a woman. Therefore, we reach 
the conclusion that wage discrimination should reduce hiring discrimination. This benefit from 
hiring women should be balanced against the higher maternity cost  m f F F −  and the 
discrimination component strictly speaking  () m f F F M − . 
The previous relationship implies three properties. First, the reduction of wage discrimination 
should increase hiring discrimination. Second, the hiring probability of a woman should 
decrease with her probability of maternity. Third, since some women value more their 
professional life than their domestic life, the banks have an interest to implement screening 
designs so as to attract the women that have the lowest probability of maternity. These designs 
can take the form of restrictions in the labor contract they offer. 
Several type of screening restrictions can be considered. The first one is the duration of the 
labor contract; a CDD (contrat à durée déterminée) is a fixed-term labor contract and a CDI 
(contrat à durée indéterminée) is a labor contract without a specified duration. In case of 
maternity, a CDD is not extended for the duration of the maternity vacation and the employer 
has the possibility to end the contract at its term, even if it occurs during the maternity vacation. 
Other screening restrictions are possible: the jobs with a wage that depends on the output or 
the jobs that clearly indicate possibilities of promotion, aim to attract the candidates that intend 
to devote themselves to their professional career. These screening measures can be interpreted 
as a reduction of the parameter M. 
Globally, the elements of the labor contract can result from an initial situation of statistical 
discrimination, such that the firms have an interest to modify the clause of the labor contracts in 
order to attract the women that put their professional career first. 
Table 1 describes the relationships between the parameters of the model and the data 
available in this study. From this simple theoretical representation, the decisions that we can 
observe can be put under the following form:  
() N ,... 1 i , M F F p y i i i , m i , f i
*
i = δ − + − =  
where N is the number of correspondence tests. The parameters can depend on each 
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i   8
The average of this variable over all the correspondence tests  ∑ =
N
1 i i D N / 1  simply gives the 
difference between the success percentages of men and women that have the same productive 
and non-productive characteristics and that have applied for the same jobs. 
In our application, we represent the parameters of the model by a set of explanative 
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2  Implementation of the correspondence tests 
We have decided to compare the access to hiring interviews between several types of pairs 
in order to better isolate the part of the gap that can be attributed to hiring discrimination. 
2.1  Three types of applications 
Three types of applications have been built: aged 25, single, childless; aged 37, single, 
childless; and aged 37, married with three children. The difference between the two first types of 
applications should reveal the difference of treatment linked to the age of the candidate. The 
difference between the two last types of applications should reveal the difference of treatment 
linked to the family constraints. The characteristics of both genders are identical. 
These three types of applications send three different signals to the employers. The family 
status of the candidates aged 25 is expected to change since, in France, the fertility rate of the 
women aged 25-29 is 130% while the fertility rate of women aged 35-39 is 50%.
2 Young 
women, in our experiment, are therefore expected to have children. The choice of the age of the 
candidates is also important in the experiment design. The choice of 37 years old results from a 
trade-off. On the one hand, it should send a signal of the stability of the family situation; the 
older a woman is, the lower her probability of a maternity. On the other hand, on the French 
labor market, when the candidates get older they have smaller chances to get a job.
3  
Overall, the probability of a maternity is the highest for the women aged 25, decreases for 
the childless women aged 37 and reaches its minimum for the women aged 37 with three 
children.
4 
Banking establishments offer four types of jobs: lowly qualified administrative jobs, highly 
qualified administrative jobs, lowly qualified commercial jobs and highly qualified commercial 
jobs. This is summarized in Table 2. The three types of applicants have been alternatively 
endowed with the four previous qualifications. Globally, 24 applications have been built. 
 
                                                                 
2 On average, the first maternity occurs when women are 29 years old. 
3 The probability to find a job decreases after 40 years old. 
4 On average, women have two children, so that women with three children will be expected to have 
completed their maternity projects.  10







































































2.2  Design of the correspondence test 
For each qualification, the three types of applicants have been endowed with a significant 
experience in the banking sector and without unemployment period. In order to avoid detection, 
the applications were not strictly identical, but the candidates have been carefully matched in all 
essential personal and experience characteristics. Therefore, the only effective distinctive 
characteristic within each pair of candidates is the gender. Thus for each job advertisement, 
applicants have been endowed with similar qualification, training, past work experience, 
personal history, hobbies, driving license, typical French first and family names. Addresses have 
been assigned to residential areas located in Paris at the same distance from the potential 
workplace and with comparable social and economic characteristics. The applicants’ 
residencies signal to employers the daily travel time and social environment.  
2.3  Implementation of the correspondence test 
In order to control for the possibility that the style or the content of a particular application 
might influence employers’ responses, the curriculum vitae were rotated among each pair of 
candidates. Moreover, the applications did not include any photography. Therefore we are sure 
that the physical appearance and personality of candidates have not been a hiring criterion and 
have not affected the outcome. Since the data collection procedure is less costly, we have been 
able constitute a larger sample: 942 applications have been sent (i.e., 471 for each gender). 
2.4  Job advertisement sources 
In France, the public organism that centralizes most of clerk and management job offers in 
the service sector is the ANPE (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi). Therefore we have used the 
ANPE job offer database, which is updated daily. In order to get a sample that is also  11
representative of other advertisement sources we have also used private websites specialized 
in job offers and the firms’ own web pages devoted to recruitment (on a daily basis). In addition, 
we have also sent unsolicited applications. This variety of sources is likely to reflect what a real 
candidate would do in order to find a job. 
2.5 Applications  mailing 
The job applications have been sent between January and March 2002.  
In order to limit the consequences of the monopolistic characteristic of the labor demand in 
banking, we have chosen to extend the study to several lines of business in the financial sector: 
commercial banks, trust banks, mutualist banks, savings bank, factoring bank, credit organisms 
and post office banking services. Secondly, we have chosen to send the applications at the 
establishment level when they were endowed with their own human resources service, rather 
than at the level of firms.  
We have focused on jobs localized near Paris and on fixed-term and permanent contracts 
(this definition excludes interim). Some establishments have been used several times when they 
have offered jobs of different profiles that corresponded to the ones of the experiment. All 
applications to one specific job have been posted simultaneously to ensure that they would 
arrive the same day. In addition, applications have been posted in different post offices in order 
to avoid detection.  
Overall, this study has been designed to reduce the potential biases of the correspondence 
testing methodology that have been highlighted in the literature. As a consequence, this data 
collection should allow for a better estimation of the hiring discrimination.  
As an additional safety, we also control for the characteristics of the applications themselves 
when we perform the regression analysis.  
Table 3: Number of correspondence tests 
 
Number of job offers *  157 
Including: 
Low qualified commercial jobs 
 
40 
Low qualified administrative jobs  24 
Highly qualified commercial jobs  58 
Highly qualified administrative jobs  35 
Number of establishments  75 
Number of firms  59 










The answer to the application is recorded as positive when the recruiter invites the candidate 
to the hiring interview or when the recruiter asks for more information about the availability and 
qualifications of the candidate. Conversely, the answer is recorded as negative when the 
recruiter rejects the application or does not answer it. Since each application is sent for both 
genders, there are four possible outcomes: neither candidate is invited, both candidates are 
invited, the man only is invited or the woman only is invited. The results are reported in Table 4. 
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3  Model and estimation 
The model and its estimation result from three characteristics that are specific to 
experimental samples. First, women and men have the same value of the explanative variables. 
Second, the samples have a small size. Third, by construction, there is no selection bias, since 
the values of the explanatory variables have been set by the researcher. 
3.1 Model 
We model the answer of the recruiter to the applications. Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ <  the answer to the 
application  i for the gender k (male, female). We have   < ￿ ￿ ￿ =  if the candidate obtains an 
interview and  ; < ￿ ￿ ￿ =  otherwise. The characteristics of both genders are identical for each i and 
are regrouped in a common vector  ￿ = . A correspondence test can be summarized in the vector 
( ) i i , f i , m X , Y , Y  where m denotes male and f female. Let  m P  the probability that a man gets an 
interview and  f P  the corresponding probability for a woman. A first definition of discrimination is 
simply:  f m P P D
~
− = . In a standard correspondence test, one simply computes the average 
difference between the success percentages of men and women. This difference can be directly 
obtained by performing an ordinary least square (henceforth, OLS) regression of the differences 
{} 1 , 0 , 1 Y Y D i , f i , m i − ∈ − =  on a constant term.
5 We have: 
6 
() () ( ) ( ) D
~
P P Y E Y E Y Y E D E f m i , f i , m i , f i , m i = − = − = − = . 
The OLS regression of  ￿ 9  on a constant term provides an unbiased and consistent estimator 
of discrimination. This first measurement of discrimination is sometimes considered as too crude 
since the same characteristics can be perceived differently by the recruiters depending on they 
belong to women or men (Heckman [1998]). 
In order to answer this critique, we generalize the model by explaining the probabilities to get 
an interview by all the characteristics  ￿ = . In order to simplify the interpretation of the regression 
coefficients, we center the explanative variables, so that  ; = = . We get: 
7 
() f , m k , X P X Y E k i
0
k i i , k = β + =  
                                                                 
5 In general, an OLS regression of a variable on a constant term gives its empirical mean. 
6 The binary variable  ￿ <  is distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter  ￿ #   w) m, (k = . 
7 The centering of the explanative variables does not imply any loss of generality since there is a constant 
term in the model. Notice that we do not center the left-hand variable. 
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which implies: 




m i i X P P X D E β − β + − = . 
The centering of the explanative variables implies that: 





i P P X D E E D E − = = . 
This measure of discrimination includes two parts. The first component, estimated by the 
constant term of the model,  0
f
0
m P P − , measures the discrimination at the average point of the 
sample (defined by  0 X Xi = = ). The second component admits three different interpretations. 
First, when the variable from  ￿ =  that is considered is related to discrimination, the quantity 
() f m i X β − β  measure conditional discrimination, that is a type of discrimination that only applies 
to a subgroup of the population under study (i.e., only to a part of the women). Second, when 
the variable from  ￿ =  that is considered is related to the productivity of the candidate (or to the 
labor cost), the quantity  () f m i X β − β  represents the differences of productivity or labor cost that 
are perceived by the recruiter. Third, when the variable from  ￿ =  that is considered deals with the 
characteristics of the correspondence test itself (type of CV, date of mailing), the quantity 
() f m i X β − β  represents the biases that would have appeared if no correction had been made. 
Standard correspondence tests often rely on the assumption that  f m β = β . We can test this 
assumption by examining whether there is a significant explanative variable in the regression of 
i D  on  i X . 
3.2 Estimation 
The estimation method can be simplified thanks to the data collection methodology. We 
avoid two sources of complications. First, there is no self-selection since the researcher makes 
the applications; only the answers of the recruiter are real. Second, there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity, so that panel data methods are not needed. 
Therefore, it is possible to use the OLS estimator provided that the predictions lies in the 
interval ]-1,+1[, since we evaluate the difference of two probabilities  f m P P − .
8 Here, there is a 
specific reason why the predictions should lie in the right interval: all the explanative variables 
are dummy variables belonging to {0,1} so that they do not take extreme values. This property 
of the explanative variables explains why the predictions should not take extreme values for a 
reasonable value of the regression coefficients. Table 5 provides the extreme values of the OLS 
predictions. 
                                                                 
8 The choice of OLS also avoids to use non linear methods that are valid on large samples only.  15
Table 5: Admissibility of OLS regressions 
Type of correspondence test  D ˆ  
 Minimum  Maximum 
Aged 25, single, childless  − 0.585  +0.555 
Aged 37, single, childless  − 0.272  +0.331 
Aged 37, married with three children  − 0.403  +0.456 
 
We have also estimated ordered Logit and Probit models and they provide comparable 
results to the main ones of the linear model. Overall, the efficiency of these estimators seems to 
be lower than the ones we have retained. They are presented in Appendix 1. 
But another caution should be taken. The sample size is small and a linear model on a 
difference of two probabilities can produce heteroskedastic disturbances.
9 Therefore, we 
estimate the standard errors by the bootstrap method.
10 We perform separate regressions for 
each type of correspondence test (see Table 4). Therefore we have 157 observations for each 
regression. There remains to set the number of bootstrap repetitions. We use the method of 
Andrews and Buchinsky [2000], presented in appendix 2. Overall, the bootstrapped standard 
errors tend to be higher than the OLS asymptotic standard errors. All the estimations have been 
performed with SAS. 
                                                                 
9 On this point, see Maddala (1983).  
10 On this method, see Efron and Tibshirani [1993].  16
4 Results 
Due to the size of our samples, we will comment on the effects that are significant at the 5% 
and at the 10% levels.
11 
A direct comparison of the means does not reveal significant differences of access to hiring 
interviews between women and men (Table 8). Similarly, the constant terms of the regressions 
are never significant (Tables 9 to 11). Therefore, there is no significant discrimination at the 
average point of the sample. On the contrary, there are significant conditional differences 
between women and men. The absence of discrimination on average conceals an interesting 
compensation effect. 
A higher qualification increases the maternity cost incurred by the firms ( f F ) because it is 
proportional to the labor cost. We find that the women childless aged 25 with a high qualification 
have a lower probability than similar men to access hiring interviews. When the age reaches 37, 
this inequality reverses and the childless women aged 37 have a higher probability than men to 
access hiring interviews. Therefore, the success of women is increasing with their age. This can 
be related to the fact that women aged 37 have a lower maternity probability (p) than the women 
aged 25. For women aged 37 with three children, we find the success probability is the same 
than men. This implies that the number of children would in fact reduce the probability of 
qualified women to access interviews. This result is likely to come from the fact the employer 
expects less flexibility (a higher M) from women with a significant family burden. A similar result 
is found for the funding of training by the firm. Childless women aged 25 have a lower 
probability than men to obtain an interview on a job that explicitly include training paid by the 
employer. This difference vanishes for women aged 37, with or without children. We have also 
computed the overall effect of qualification on the probability to get an interview (Table 6). Our 
basic result is confirmed: young qualified women have a lower probability to get an interview at 
the 5% level. 
                                                                 
11 When the normality tests are rejected, we use the percentages of positive and negative estimates, 
that have been computed independently from the standard errors. They are given in the column 
« Proba[Coeff>0] or Proba[Coeff<0]  » depending on the coefficient is positive or negative. A value of 0.95 
or higher means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
  17
Table 6: Conditional Effect of Qualification 





















Aged 25, childless  0.131**  0.063  0.984  0.250 
Aged 37, childless  -0.024  0.045  0.695  0.005 
Aged 37 with three children  0.023  0.045  0.679  0.005 
The other results deal with the screening through the clauses of the labor contract, which 
aim to reduce the M parameter. The mainstream of screening concentrates on childless women 
aged 25. They have fewer chances to access interviews when the job is a long-run contract. 
This effect cancels for 37 years old women. Childless women aged 37 are not globally subject 
to discrimination: they even have more chances than men to access interviews on commercial 
jobs. This result is confirmed for the women aged 37 with three children: they have more 
chances than men to access interviews on jobs with a possibility of promotion. 
Globally, the main differences of treatment concentrate on childless young women. 
Institutional mechanisms, however, counterbalance this negative effect. Childless young women 
have more chances than men to access interviews at La Poste or in credit organisms. The first 
result can be explained by the fact that La Poste is a public firm that promotes social objectives. 
In the case of credit organisms, which mostly operate by phone, the explanation could rely on 
the preferences of customers (that reduces M). 
Finally, passing through the ANPE seems to have a positive effect on the chances to access 
interviews for women aged 37 with three children. Therefore, the existence of some institutional 
practices seems to compensate the cost differences between women and men.  18
Conclusion 
Data collection by field experiments does not exempt from the use of econometric methods. 
We show that one should take into account all the characteristics of the application, of the type 
of job and of the firm. 
The main differences of treatment between women and men originate in the presence of 
children and on the maternity expectations of the recruiters. These informations, that already 
play an important role on the labor supply, would also play an important role on the labor 
demand in the financial sector. This first effect, negative, on the access to interviews, is 
compensated by a positive effect taking place at La Poste, credit organisms and ANPE. 
Since the access to hiring interviews drives the access to jobs, we should see a reallocation 
of the female workforce toward the financial lines of business where the working conditions are 
the most compatible with family obligations. Even though it is difficult to generalize from this 
study, our results suggest that the equilibrium on the financial labor market would depend on 
the evolution of demography. 
Since the unfavorable treatment of women that we observe is related to the difference of 
expected labor costs, one should be tempted to conclude that there is no discrimination. 
However, the conclusion may be different if we think to fairness. 
Indeed, the children obviously result from a joint decision of women and men and our results 
tend to show than only women would bear the consequences. The fact that the decision is joint 
suggests that a fairer situation could be achieved by spreading the costs over both women and 
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Appendix 1 – Ordered Logit Regressions 
In order to check that the estimation method does not drive our results, we have estimated ordered Logit and Probit 
models (using SAS). We chose the Ordered Logit model since it performs better according to Vuong’s test (1989). 
The non-nested tests are presented in Table A.1 and the ordered Logit regressions in Table A.2. Our results remain 
unchanged by the application of this different estimation method. 
Table A.1: Vuong test of Ordered Logit versus Ordered Probit 
Type of correspondence test  Vuong t-statistic  p-value  Preferred model 
at the 5% level 
Aged 25, single, childless  1.65  0.101  Equivalent 
Aged 37, single, childless  2.18  0.030  Ordered Logit 
Aged 37, married with three 
children 
3.92 0.001  Ordered  Logit 
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Appendix 2 – Number of Bootstrap repetitions 


















   1 ￿  
where  ￿ 6 θ  is the bootstrap estimator on B simulations and  ∞ θ6  the “ideal” bootstrap estimator 
that would be obtained with an infinite number of repetitions. The quantity pdb represents the 
upper bound on the error, expressed as a percentage of the “ideal” estimator, and the quantity 
τ −   is the probability with which one reach that result. For this application, we have set   #	 =  
and       = τ , which implies a maximum error of 5% with a probability equal to 95%. The 
parameter on which the number of bootstrap repetition is determined also matters. We have 
chosen the p-values of the OLS estimators.  
More precisely we use the probability that positive OLS coefficients are strictly positive and 
the probability that negative OLS coefficients are strictly negative, in order to avoid an arbitrary 
large number of simulations (Andrews and Buchinsky [2000]). 
The estimation method includes three steps.
12 In the first step, we compute an initial number 
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'- /￿  for a negative coefficient. 
In this first step # 6  is computed by using the asymptotic normality of the OLS estimation. This 
convention does not affect the validity of the final number of bootstrap repetition. It is just a 
starting value. In practice, the OLS gives a set of estimated parameters so that we take the 
maximum number of simulations to perform the OLS regressions.  
In the second step of the method, we make  {} ￿ ￿ /  / =  simulations and compute a non-
parametric estimate of # 6 , by taking the proportion of strictly positive estimates or the proportion 
of strictly negative estimates depending on the explanative variable. On denote this new 
estimation of p by π6 . The new number of simulations is given by: 
                                                                 
12 In what follows,  ￿ 7  represents que q-th percentile of the standard normal distribution and []   denotes 



















'- /￿  for a negative coefficient.  
Accounting for all the regression coefficients, the actual number of simulations is equal to 
{} ￿ ￿ /  / = . The optimal number of simulations is defined by: 
{} ￿ ￿
￿ / % /  / =  
If the number of simulations made in the first step is sufficient (i.e.  ￿ ￿ / / ≥ ), we stop the 
method at the second step and compute the statistics on the  ￿ /  repetitions already made. 
Otherwise, we pass the third step.  
In the third step, if  ￿ ￿ / / < , we make  ￿
￿ / / −  additional simulations, that are added to the first 
step simulations. Then, we compute the statistics from the  ￿ /  simulations. The optimal numbers 
of simulations are presented in the Tables 8 to 11, knowing that all statistics are computed on 
the maximum of the number of simulations. 
 